Can Europe and China create a new economic bargain?
A potential economic reset with China that addresses security concerns requires preserving Europe’s industrial capabilities while strengthening the rules of engagement, assesses researcher Patrick Schröder.
18 Nov 2026
Economy
Even amid intense industrial competition, Brussels and Beijing can still find room for compromise. The recent easing of EU-China trade tensions after an understanding on plug-in hybrid car exports is a timely reminder that economic competition need not lead inevitably to confrontation. October’s understanding on China’s hybrid electric vehicle exports to Europe, alongside continued negotiations on battery electric vehicles and steps to facilitate rare earths licensing, suggests there is new room for compromise. These are initial steps, but they point towards a potential reset that preserves economic exchange while addressing Europe’s and China’s economic security concerns.
The significance lies in demonstrating that trade negotiations can produce alternatives to escalating tariffs and retaliation. The challenge now is to turn this opening into a broader economic arrangement that also addresses more structural economic challenges.
Balancing open markets and self-sufficiency
A new economic bargain between Europe and China will need to recognise that the geoeconomic landscape has shifted. Economic sovereignty in a geopolitical environment requires domestic manufacturing capability. China recognised this early. Its 2015 Made in China 2025 strategy focused on building domestic capabilities in advanced manufacturing. A key target was to achieve self-sufficiency in domestic sourcing of core components and key basic materials at 70% by 2025, a goal achieved in key sectors such as electric vehicles, power equipment, aerospace and shipping.
Europe is now re-learning the importance of having domestic productive capacity for its economic sovereignty. As a result, the previous open and market-led model that favoured free trade is being adjusted. There is a clear shift towards more state involvement in industrial policy, including control of industries that are considered relevant for strategic autonomy and sovereignty.
A recent UK House of Commons committee report, China and the UK Economy: The Case for Risk-Managed Growth, makes this challenge explicit. Published on 2 November, it calls for clearer rules on governing sovereign economic and industrial capabilities. It proposes a framework on prohibited sectors (so-called “red zones”) and conditional and encouraged economic engagement with China. While the report’s recommendations are not yet an adopted government strategy, the underlying question applies across Europe: if governments expect businesses to pursue growth and trade with China while managing strategic economic risks, they must provide predictable rules.
European governments are increasingly prepared to intervene directly to preserve industrial capabilities they regard as essential to sovereignty and economic security, including through selective public ownership of companies. A recent example is the nationalisation of the UK’s steel manufacturer British Steel in July 2026, previously owned by China’s Jingye Group. These interventions are not exclusively directed at China: For example, in 2024 the UK government acquired the defence semiconductor factory Octric from an American company, while the takeover of the energy company Uniper by the German government in 2022 was a response to dependence on Russian gas.
But this shift requires clearer security boundaries. Europe should specify which capabilities require domestic or trusted-partner control, which investments need safeguards and where commercial engagement with China is encouraged. Safeguarding Europe’s economic sovereignty should not come at the expense of the foundations of an open economy. This means preventing unfair competition, protecting sensitive technologies and ensuring that essential services can withstand supply disruptions, while preserving space for beneficial trade and investment. Safeguards should be proportionate, transparent and regularly reviewed, giving Chinese companies a clear route to demonstrate compliance.
Clean energy cooperation for economic security
A key sector where this is important is clean energy cooperation. Chinese investment in European battery manufacturing, renewables, energy storage and the circular economy can build local supply chains and industrial capacity while giving Chinese firms a more stable foothold in the European market. The EU’s proposed Industrial Accelerator Act gives this cooperation a sharper industrial focus. Its “Made in Europe” provisions would use public procurement and support schemes to increase demand for European-made clean technologies. Joint projects on grid extension, flexibility and equipment that can withstand extreme weather would help both economies keep essential services running through heatwaves, floods and storms. Faster deployment of clean power would further reduce exposure to fossil fuel price shocks, thereby improving economic sovereignty.
While the sector should not by default be a “red zone”, it is obvious that clean energy cooperation depends on trust, especially when it involves infrastructure that is needed to keep the lights on. The UK’s decision to block Chinese manufacturer Ming Yang’s proposed offshore wind turbine factory in Scotland in March 2026 illustrates how national security concerns can block investment that could otherwise build domestic manufacturing capacity.

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Going forward, wind energy security assessments and investment should distinguish between manufacturing equipment and supplying equipment with software, remote access or maintenance arrangements that could affect the operation of wind farms. For strategically important investments in energy grid infrastructure, requirements could include secure data management, independent cybersecurity checks, and diversified component sourcing.
European governments will need to publish clear screening criteria and apply them consistently. Chinese investors should know what they need to disclose about ownership, subsidies and supply chains; what environmental and fair competition requirements apply; and how to demonstrate that their equipment meets cybersecurity standards. Independent testing, controls on remote access and software updates, and clear incident reporting requirements can help regulators verify those assurances over the life of a project.
A new economic bargain will also require sustained technical cooperation between China and Europe to align standards for green technologies. Making this work will involve detailed negotiations on testing methods, environmental performance, carbon footprint methodologies and data governance, supported by credible verification arrangements. Cooperation between two major markets could help shape global standards, reduce duplication and accelerate the deployment of low carbon technologies worldwide. Digital traceability should be a priority, particularly for enabling the circular use of critical minerals.
The EU’s forthcoming Battery Passport and China’s battery identification system will be a test case. These systems should become complementary and interoperable, allowing information on material composition, condition and recovery to move securely across borders and along value chains. Common data definitions and compatible systems, with safeguards for commercially sensitive information, would reduce compliance burdens for businesses.
Addressing the EU-China trade imbalance
Economic sovereignty rests not only on industrial strength and production, but also on a domestic market where households have the purchasing power and confidence to sustain demand. For China, this means shifting some fiscal support from industrial expansion to households and strengthening pensions, healthcare and unemployment protection so that families can spend more of their income with less need for precautionary saving, giving Chinese industry a stronger home market and reducing its reliance on exports.
The EU’s goods trade deficit with China reached nearly 360 billion euros in 2025, or about 1 billion euros a day. The opening in Europe-China trade relations should be used to address this longer-term issue. Europe needs stronger productive capacity and cheaper clean energy; China needs more confident consumers and stronger social protection. Both need dependable rules for trade, investment, technology development and critical materials. A bargain linking these priorities could preserve cooperation, strengthen economic security and give households and businesses greater confidence in a deeply uncertain international environment.
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