A new railway, a deeper Russian dependence on China?

A second standard-gauge track crossing Russia’s Zabaikalsk and China’s Manzhouli signals pragmatic convergence over trade bottlenecks and food security. However, researcher Genevieve Donnellon-May notes that it deepens Moscow’s economic lock-in with China and leaves border revitalisation unproven.

20 Nov 2026

Economy

The Manzhouli gate between Russia and China, 2008.
The Manzhouli gate between Russia and China, 2008. (Photo: jason_she/Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0)

On 2 November, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the law ratifying an agreement with China to build a second railway track across the border at Zabaikalsk–Manzhouli. The State Duma ratified it on 15 October, and the Federation Council approved it on 28 October. Signed in Beijing on 20 May during Putin’s state visit, the agreement covers a second 1,435-millimetre-gauge track on the Manzhouli–Zabaikalsk cross-border railway.

Zabaikalsk–Manzhouli is the largest land crossing between China and Russia, connecting China’s rail network to the Trans-Siberian Railway and serving as a key node for China–Europe freight trains. Manzhouli’s railway port handled 21.7 million tonnes of freight in 2025. According to Russia’s Ministry of Transport, the second 1,435-millimetre track will raise the Zabaikalsk crossing’s capacity to 39 million tonnes a year by 2030, 11 million tonnes more than current levels, allowing almost 50 pairs of trains to cross daily. Its significance lies less in its share of total trade than in what it carries and where it leads.

Two pressures converge here: Western sanctions have redirected Russian trade eastward, while conflict in the Gulf has exposed the vulnerability of the maritime routes China’s imports depend on. The question is whether deeper cross-border trade can strengthen supply security without making Russia more dependent on China, leaving border regions as little more than transit points.

Moscow yielding on rail sovereignty?

The agreement’s most striking feature is its gauge. Russia’s network uses 1,520-millimetre track, China’s the 1,435-millimetre standard, and the break of gauge is both a logistical bottleneck and a marker of two separate national systems. Yet a Chinese-standard track on Russian territory is not unprecedented: the crossing’s infrastructure already includes one 1,435-millimetre track and two Russian 1,520-millimetre tracks.

A train on 1,435 mm standard-gauge track entering Manzhouli, China, from Russia, with 1,520/1,435 mm bogie exchange yard in the distance, 10 August 2009.
A train on 1,435 mm standard-gauge track entering Manzhouli, China, from Russia, with 1,520/1,435 mm bogie exchange yard in the distance, 10 August 2009. (Photo: Jack No1/Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0)

Control of the railway has shifted before. Manzhouli was the first station inside China on the Chinese Eastern Railway, which Tsarist Russia built under the 1896 Sino-Russian Secret Treaty and handed to the People’s Republic of China on 31 December 1952. Today’s limited agreement contrasts with that history of concessions and transfers.

The new track extends the existing Chinese-standard rail link rather than bringing the two countries’ networks towards a common gauge — a move that Li Yonghui of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) considers “neither mature nor realistic in the short term”. Li described a proposed connecting track of about 10 kilometres, nine kilometres of which would lie in China, leaving only the border station’s yard on the Russian side. As Russia’s official newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta noted, “Chinese infrastructure could not cope”. The project therefore seeks to address a bottleneck affecting both sides, rather than simply accommodate Chinese demand.

Moscow has nonetheless guarded its sovereignty. The project uses an intergovernmental agreement to extend a foreign gauge onto Russian territory. The treaty expires 60 days after the track enters service, expected in 2027. This is a limited accommodation, not a surrender of Russia’s broad-gauge network, yet it reflects asymmetric interdependence: under sanctions, Russia has a greater need for eastbound capacity than China has for any single crossing.

Anchoring Russia’s economy to China?

Since 2022, sanctions have redirected Russian energy, fertiliser, timber and other bulk commodities from Europe to China. China retained its position as Russia’s largest trading partner, accounting for approximately 27% of Russia’s exports and 36% of its imports in 2025. For Beijing, Russia is a smaller but still significant partner: it was China’s fifth-largest trading partner in 2025, with bilateral trade reaching US$228.11 billion.

Trade fell slightly in 2025 before rebounding 30.6% to US$214.3 billion in the first nine months of 2026, according to Chinese customs data. The new track adds export capacity and could ease pressure on Russian Railways (RZD), whose eastbound network has been strained by the pivot to Asia and whose debt ratio is close to its permitted ceiling. Pavel Ivankin of the National Research Centre for Transport and Infrastructure expects the track to “finally synchronise the capacities of the Russian and Chinese railways”.

View of Zabaikalsk Railway Station, Zabaykalski Krai, Russia, from Manzhouli, Inner Mongolia, China, 17 July 2025.
View of Zabaikalsk Railway Station, Zabaykalski Krai, Russia, from Manzhouli, Inner Mongolia, China, 17 July 2025. (Photo: Liuxingy/Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International)

The longer-term trade-off is deeper economic lock-in. Transport analyst Dmitry Romensky wrote in Rossiyskaya Gazeta that the track encourages long-term mutual trade growth, but each new link also raises the sunk costs of Russia’s reorientation towards Chinese markets and standards. Russia sends mainly timber, minerals and fertiliser through the crossing, while importing Chinese chemicals, building materials and machinery. For Moscow, the track offers near-term gains in capacity, revenue and access to a sanctions-resilient market, but risks reinforcing longer-term dependence unless Russia improves its position in the value chains that trade supports.

Food-system sustainability

Agriculture reveals both the asymmetry and the limits of bilateral interdependence. China-Russia agricultural trade reached US$11.35 billion in 2025, according to the China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Foodstuffs, Native Produce and Animal By-products.

China imported US$8.01 billion in Russian agricultural goods, led by aquatic and marine products (US$3.21 billion) and vegetable oils (US$1.84 billion), and exported US$3.34 billion, mainly fruit and vegetables. Yet Russia supplied only 3.9% of China’s agricultural imports, ranking eighth; Brazil alone shipped 82.3 million tonnes of soybeans to China in 2025. The relationship matters more to Moscow: China took nearly a fifth of Russia’s US$40.9 billion in agricultural exports, based on Russian data (see Figure 1).

(Figure 1)

Fertiliser is the area in which China relies most heavily on Russia, particularly for potash. China is a net exporter of nitrogen and phosphate fertilisers, shipping 4.89 million tonnes of urea and 3.48 million tonnes of diammonium phosphate overseas in 2025. Potash, however, is a different story. China produced only about 5.82 million tonnes of potassium chloride (potash) that year, while importing 12.61 million tonnes to meet much of its domestic demand.

Russia supplied 4.6 million tonnes, accounting for more than a third of China’s total potash imports (calculated), according to Chinese customs data reported by Interfax. Across all fertiliser types, Russia accounted for 35% of China’s imports. Chinese imports of Russian potash have almost tripled, from 1.7 million tonnes in 2022 (see Table 1).

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For Russia, China is an important but not dominant market, taking about one-ninth of its fertiliser exports, which totalled 45 million tonnes in 2025.

For Beijing, Russian supplies complement domestic production and import diversification. During the 15th Five-Year Plan period (2026-2030), China will expand imports of quality agricultural products “while diversifying source countries”, according to Sun Meijun, head of the General Administration of Customs. 

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As Jiao Yuping of Central China Normal University and Zheng Zhihao of Renmin University observe in their analysis, China remains a major grain importer dependent on maritime transport, a long-standing concern captured by the “Malacca dilemma”. Amid ongoing tensions in the Middle East, disruption to key imports through the Strait of Hormuz has sharpened it. Overland routes offer another source of supply, even as they increase reliance on neighbouring producers.

Russian farm exports to China have fluctuated, falling from US$8.7 billion in 2023 to US$7.3 billion in 2024 before recovering to US$7.7 billion in 2025. Russia’s Federal Centre for Agricultural Exports reported that shipments rose 44% to more than US$4.9 billion in the first half of 2026. Rosselkhoznadzor, Russia’s veterinary and phytosanitary regulator, put grain shipments to China, including Hong Kong, at a record of about 6 million tonnes by mid-October 2026. A May protocol on Russian compound feed exports opens another channel.

Structural barriers remain. Xiao Huizhong of East China Normal University argued that shipping Russian produce through the Zabaikalsk–Manzhouli grain rail freight station can cut logistics costs by a third, but Russian export duties on oilseeds and sensitivities over Chinese farmland leasing and labour in the Far East and Siberia were constraining factors. Zhang Hongxia of CASS has similarly argued that the scale and level of bilateral agricultural cooperation lag far behind the two countries’ economic development. Scale is another limitation: China imported 140.56 million tonnes of grain in 2025, while the new track adds only 11 million tonnes of annual capacity for all goods. The land route is a hedge, not a replacement for maritime supply chains; its value lies in extra capacity for strategic inputs, particularly fertiliser.

Can the corridor revitalise the rust belt?

The corridor’s regional value depends on whether it generates local industry rather than simply moving goods across the border. China’s northeast — Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang — is an old industrial base often called the country’s rust belt. The three provinces had 98.51 million people in 2020, 11.01 million fewer than a decade earlier, according to the National Bureau of Statistics. Beijing launched its northeast revitalisation strategy in 2003; the official region also includes five eastern Inner Mongolian cities and leagues, including Hulunbuir, where Manzhouli is located.

In 2023, Chinese President Xi Jinping called the northeast “an important gateway for China’s opening to the north”, urging it to extend industrial chains and raise added value. The 15th Five-Year Plan pledges “new breakthroughs” in northeast revitalisation and to “accelerate opening to the north”. In April, Beijing approved a China (Inner Mongolia) Pilot Free Trade Zone, including a Manzhouli area tasked with developing “smart ports” and an “important bridgehead for China’s opening to the north”. Traffic is already growing: 4,658 China–Europe trains passed through Manzhouli in the first nine months of 2026, up 34.7%.

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Yet most regional economies grew more slowly than the national average of 5.0% in 2025 (see Table 2), while Heilongjiang’s population fell to 30.01 million by the end of 2025. Connectivity has not failed, but trade alone cannot deliver revitalisation.

For the region’s farms, imports bring both competition and opportunity. Heilongjiang harvested more than 9 million tonnes of soybeans in 2025, over 40% of national output. More Russian grain and oilseeds could squeeze local farmers, but processed locally, they could support crushing and feed industries. There are early signs of this in Manzhouli, where Russian flaxseed and oats are hulled, pressed and milled into edible oil and grain products for Chinese markets. One local processor’s imports of Russian farm goods rose from about 7,400 tonnes to 19,000 tonnes in 2025, helped by a border-trade zone that gives residents a daily duty-free allowance of 8,000 RMB (US$1,200).

A combine loads wheat into a truck during harvesting in a field in the Krasnoyarsk region, Russia, 9 September 2026.
A combine loads wheat into a truck during harvesting in a field in the Krasnoyarsk region, Russia, 9 September 2026. (Vladislav Nekrasov/Reuters)

Russia faces a similar challenge of retaining more value at home. Moscow has extended export duties on sunflower seeds, which the government says aim to stimulate domestic oilseed processing, amid suggestions of raising the soybean export duty from 20% to 30%. On both sides, border regions need investment and industrial capacity, not just transport links, to capture more of the gains.

Not about volume

The second track at Zabaikalsk–Manzhouli is modest infrastructure with wider strategic significance. Moscow gains export capacity and a major market under sanctions, but accepts deeper ties with its largest trading partner. Beijing gains another overland channel for strategic inputs, as China’s farms increasingly rely on Russian potash, though the railway complements rather than replaces maritime trade. 

If the new free trade zone and local processing gain traction, the corridor could give the northeast a stronger industrial role in Eurasian commerce and give Russia a stake in adding value rather than simply shipping volume. Its significance will depend less on the volume it carries than on whether both countries can turn connectivity into domestic value creation and more widely shared gains.

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