How far can Singapore’s own laws go in the chip war?

The US has moved to close loopholes on remote access to advanced chips but if Singapore can be unwittingly embroiled, how far can relying on its own laws be enough to deal with such cases? SMU academic Han-Wei Liu analyses the issue.

17 Nov 2026

Politics

The city skyline of Singapore on 16 October 2026.
The city skyline of Singapore on 16 October 2026. (Yuichi Yamazaki/AFP)

On 16 November 2026, Washington released a rule tightening control over advanced chips shipped to Singapore and four other countries, and over who may use them through data centres. Singapore does not enforce unilateral US export controls, but it cannot avoid their effects. Days earlier, its authorities had given details of an investigation into Megaspeed, a Singapore-incorporated company, over purchases of artificial intelligence(AI) servers. The suspected offences fall under Singapore law, not US export controls. Together, these developments expose a dilemma for a hub economy: Singapore can make and enforce its own laws, but access to the chips its AI ambitions depend on is also shaped by decisions made elsewhere.

Why Singapore?

Singapore connects Southeast Asia with global flows of trade, finance and investment, and it has courted AI investment as a matter of policy. Companies from the US and China alike use this ecosystem. A purchase may be financed and invoiced in Singapore, delivered elsewhere, and used by a customer in a third jurisdiction. Such arrangements serve legitimate business when they comply with applicable law. But when financing, delivery and end-use span jurisdictions, verifying a transaction is difficult.

Nvidia’s own accounts show how far billing and delivery can diverge. Its fiscal 2025 report attributed 18% of total revenue to customers billed in Singapore, while shipments to Singapore represented less than 2% of total revenue. The company explained that customers centralised invoicing here. An invoice address cannot settle where a chip went, who used it, or whether a licence was required. Yet even a lawful hub faces pressure to verify sensitive transactions and address US concerns. Washington can restrict the technology reaching Singapore, with consequences for Singapore’s businesses and AI investment. How far can Singapore’s own laws take it? 

Sovereign rules

Singapore’s export control regime is its own, anchored in the rule of law at home and the rules-based order abroad. Singapore does not enforce other countries’ unilateral export controls, though it expects businesses here to take those rules into account. Its strategic goods controls draw principally on multilateral lists rather than automatically mirroring Washington’s controls. A chip or a company that the US restricts is therefore not necessarily restricted here.

The premises of Megaspeed International at Ocean Financial Centre in Singapore on 10 November 2026.
The premises of Megaspeed International at Ocean Financial Centre in Singapore on 10 November 2026. (SPH Media)

That independence, however, does not mean indifference to wrongdoing. Singapore has a reason to avoid taking sides: incorporating US restrictions on Chinese firms into its own law could complicate relations with Beijing, while doing nothing about suspected misconduct could strain its relationship with Washington. The use of domestic offences offers a way between those pressures.

By 13 November, five individuals and six companies had been charged with offences including fraud and money laundering in a case involving server purchases. These are allegations to be tested in court, not findings of guilt, and the investigation into Megaspeed itself is still under way. But the choice of legal tools matters: by pursuing alleged dishonesty under its own laws, Singapore can signal that it takes enforcement seriously without internalising Washington’s decisions about which Chinese firms to restrict. It is a way to depoliticise enforcement and reduce geopolitical risk, an approach I have dubbed ”doctrinal independence through substitution”.

The limits of substitution?

That approach may have its limits. The first is what the law covers. The charges brought so far concern alleged misconduct under domestic law; a breach of US export controls is not, in itself, an offence here. Because Singapore’s export controls are not aligned with US rules, a shipment that violates a US restriction may breach no Singapore control. If it is honestly declared and otherwise complies with Singapore law, there is no offence to prosecute, and investigators cannot bridge that gap by working harder. The second is timing. Under US export controls, a licence may be required before a shipment moves. Where Singapore requires no permit, action under ordinary criminal law depends on evidence of a domestic offence, which often emerges only after the fact. Investigators can act earlier if tipped off, but that requires timely intelligence, and the evidence may sit abroad. Early information from suppliers and foreign authorities therefore matters if a suspect shipment is to be stopped in time. Such information sharing may count for more as the Johor-Singapore Special Economic Zone deepens cross-border flows. But each country determines responsibility according to its own laws, and geopolitical pressures transcend national borders. Cooperation can help bridge these differences, but it cannot eliminate them.

Ministry of Home Affairs headquarters at New Phoenix Park in Singapore on 30 June 2026.
Ministry of Home Affairs headquarters at New Phoenix Park in Singapore on 30 June 2026. (SPH Media)

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Narrowing them further would mean aligning the law itself. Washington has sought closer alignment through trade negotiations, and some Asian neighbours have moved on their own: Taiwan added Huawei and SMIC to its strategic high-tech commodities entity list, and Malaysia announced permit requirements for exports, transhipment and transit of high-performance US-origin AI chips in July 2025. Each step goes beyond the multilateral baseline and can be read as a political signal, with geopolitical costs as well as benefits. Singapore has, so far, not taken that path.

Conditional access

For businesses, Singapore’s independent stance offers no exemption from foreign law. US controls follow covered items through re-exports and transfers outside the US. Increasingly, they also look at who owns a company, not just where it is incorporated. One US rule, adopted in 2025 and suspended until January 2027, would extend licensing requirements applicable to certain listed firms to non-US companies that are at least 50% owned, directly or indirectly, by one or more of them. For any company that uses Singapore as a base for global expansion, a local address is neither a mark against it nor a shield from applicable export controls.

Singapore is an early signatory of the US-led Pax Silica declaration.
Singapore is an early signatory of the US-led Pax Silica declaration. (US Department of State)

The 16 November interim final rule imposes new licence requirements for certain advanced chips exported, re-exported, or transferred to Singapore and four other countries. It also requires licences for certain transfers of covered chips for use in data centres providing substantial computing access to companies headquartered, or whose ultimate parent is headquartered, in China or other US arms-embargoed destinations. The rule will take effect upon publication in the Federal Register. Congress is considering further measures. The Chip Security Act proposes location-verification safeguards, while the Remote Access Security Act addresses remote access through networks and cloud services. The AI OVERWATCH Act would strengthen oversight of advanced chip exports to countries of concern, and the MATCH Act would press allies to align controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment, with unilateral US controls as a fallback. 

For hubs like Singapore, these measures are likely to add compliance costs while helping to reassure suppliers. For operators selling computing capacity, they could also change the business case: if limits on who may use it shut out customers and no replacement demand appears, capacity built or planned across Southeast Asia could sit underused, even if no chip is ever diverted. Lower expected returns could, in turn, force operators and their backers to revisit customer contracts and financing arrangements. Heightened customer screening and verification are becoming part of the cost of doing business. It would be premature, however, to predict a broader relocation from Singapore and the region.

Room to choose

The scrutiny surrounding Nvidia has added to calls for tighter US controls on China’s access to advanced chips, though US industry seems divided over how far restrictions should go. Nor will the contest stop at chips. It is, increasingly, extending to AI models, to the terms on which they are made available, and to the partnerships and rules built around them. China, meanwhile, has proposed extending its export controls to more AI technologies. Different cooperation frameworks are taking shape: Singapore was a founding signatory of the US-led Pax Silica declaration and is weighing an invitation to join the China-initiated World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization. As these frameworks draw in more technologies and partners, maintaining access across them may become harder. For Singapore and its neighbours, the challenge will be to preserve room to choose.

The question is how to stay trusted by both sides while retaining room to engage across these frameworks. Doing so need not mean adopting foreign controls wholesale. Singapore can enforce its own laws visibly, seek cooperation that runs in both directions, and press suppliers and partner governments for rules its businesses can plan around: which services and customers are affected, what must be verified, and how long there is to adjust when the rules change. In a 16 November joint statement, Singapore’s digital and trade ministries said they have been engaging US authorities and exploring trusted access to advanced chips for Singapore companies, though the outcome remains to be seen. Those choices are Singapore’s to make. How long they keep access open will depend partly on decisions made elsewhere.

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