Netanyahu may go, but Israel’s China constraints stay

Whoever forms the Israeli government, disagreements over the Palestinian issue, US restrictions on cooperation in sensitive technology sectors, and Israeli concerns about China’s relationship with Iran are unlikely to change, says Chinese academic Guang Yang.

19 Nov 2026

Politics

Israel's President Isaac Herzog (right) and Israeli opposition bloc leader Gadi Eisenkot pose with the signed mandate to form a new government during a press conference in Jerusalem on 8 November 2026.
Israel's President Isaac Herzog (right) and Israeli opposition bloc leader Gadi Eisenkot pose with the signed mandate to form a new government during a press conference in Jerusalem on 8 November 2026. (Ilia Yefimovich/AFP)

Israel’s 27 October Knesset election weakened Benjamin Netanyahu but left the country without a workable coalition. Neither Netanyahu’s bloc nor the non-Arab opposition parties secured a majority. On 8 November, President Isaac Herzog tasked the head of Yashar Party, Gadi Eisenkot, with forming a government, but whether a new government can be formed is still uncertain.

The makeup of a potential coalition and Israel’s broader foreign policy ties suggest that even if Eisenkot becomes prime minister, Israel’s Chinese policy is set to remain largely unchanged. Disagreements over the Palestinian issue, US restrictions on cooperation in sensitive technology sectors, and Israeli concerns about China’s relationship with Iran are unlikely to disappear with a change of government.

The new government will still face old constraints

During the coalition talks, Israel’s security decisions will be closely watched. Netanyahu remains caretaker prime minister. In a letter to Netanyahu on 11 November, Eisenkot called for restraint in the use of security forces, saying they should not be deployed unless there is a direct, imminent and unavoidable threat. Whether Israel can avoid further military escalation during this period will have implications for regional diplomacy and for Beijing’s dealings with the Israeli government.

Settlement policy is a major point of contention in China-Israel relations. During a meeting with Israeli President Isaac Herzog in Baku on 15 October, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi urged Israel to open all access routes into Gaza and halt and reverse the forced establishment of settlements in the West Bank. Therefore, even if Eisenkot manages to form a government, the differences between China and Israel over the Palestinian issue are unlikely to be resolved anytime soon, because a government dependent on right-wing coalition partners would find it difficult to make any significant change to settlement policy.

The Palestinian village of Turmus Ayya, north of Ramallah in the occupied West Bank (foreground) and the Israeli settlement of Shilo (background) on 2 November 2026.
The Palestinian village of Turmus Ayya, north of Ramallah in the occupied West Bank (foreground) and the Israeli settlement of Shilo (background) on 2 November 2026. (Zain Jaafar/AFP)

The US also limits the scope for closer cooperation between China and Israel. Washington has long voiced concerns about Chinese involvement in Israel’s infrastructure and sensitive technology sectors, using diplomatic pressure to discourage such ties and urging Israel to tighten its investment screening. Given Israel’s reliance on the US for its security and investment, any incoming government seeking to expand cooperation with China would have to weigh the potential costs of friction with Washington.

Bilateral disputes cut across Israel’s political spectrum. In May, several members of the Knesset visited Taiwan and made erroneous remarks regarding the Taiwan question, seriously violating the “one China” principle and China’s core interests. China firmly opposes any form of official exchanges between its diplomatic partners and the Taiwan region. Whether a new government can reduce such friction will depend on how it handles differing positions on China within its coalition. Netanyahu’s departure alone is unlikely to resolve these disagreements.

What Israel expects from China on Iran

Israel has also publicly called on China to use its influence with Iran. On various occasions, Israel urged Beijing to use its political and economic leverage to press Iran to curb its military and nuclear activities. China’s foreign ministry, in response, emphasised the need for a sustained and effective ceasefire and a diplomatic and political solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.

China has continued to call for a ceasefire and a resumption of negotiations. In September, Wang Yi met with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, urging Iran and the US to return to the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding and calling on all parties to reopen the Strait of Hormuz as soon as possible to safeguard energy supplies. He also reaffirmed that China’s policy towards Iran remained consistent and unchanged.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi meets with China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Beijing, China, on 16 September 2026.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi meets with China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Beijing, China, on 16 September 2026. (Iranian Foreign Ministry/West Asia News Agency/via Reuters)

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Talks and the reopening of shipping lanes serve China’s stated objectives, while a more stable regional environment would also be in Israel’s interests. Israel can use its channels of communication with Beijing to raise concerns about Iran’s nuclear and military activities. Whether China can help secure the concessions Israel seeks from Iran, however, depends on Beijing’s willingness and ability to exert pressure on Tehran. China must weigh any such pressure against its broader relationship with Iran, while Tehran will ultimately make its own decisions based on its security concerns.

What further limits Israel’s ability to secure Beijing’s help on Iran is its lack of diplomatic leverage. Its advanced technology sector is one of its biggest assets, but cooperation in sensitive areas is restricted by US pressure and export controls, which limits Israel’s ability to independently expand cooperation with China. However, there is still room to make progress in day-to-day trade and people-to-people exchanges, which can help improve bilateral ties.

Meanwhile, Israel’s regional policies will also have a bearing on the prospects for closer cooperation with China. Improving humanitarian access to Gaza and avoiding further military escalation would address concerns Beijing has already expressed and help create a more favourable political climate for cooperation on regional issues, including Iran. But these steps are politically sensitive within Israel and would test the new government’s ability to bridge differences among its coalition partners.

China’s limited role in Saudi-Israel normalisation

Both Iran and Saudi Arabia have direct diplomatic channels to Beijing. On 2 November, Wang Yi held separate meetings with senior officials from the two countries to discuss regional developments. In his meeting with the Saudi delegation, he called for an end to the fighting and urged all parties to safeguard regional energy supplies and keep shipping routes open.

People on the beach, with vessels in the Strait of Hormuz visible near the beach of Bandar Abbas, Iran, on 16 November 2026.
People on the beach, with vessels in the Strait of Hormuz visible near the beach of Bandar Abbas, Iran, on 16 November 2026. (Razieh Poudat/ISNA/via West Asia News Agency/via Reuters)

Saudi-Israel normalisation comes with more specific political conditions. In November 2025, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman said at the White House that Riyadh was interested in joining the Abraham Accords, but made clear that this would require a credible path towards a two-state solution. Beijing’s support for a two-state solution fits that position. Israel can hardly expect Beijing to persuade Riyadh to soften this demand. Progress towards normalisation will ultimately depend on Israel’s willingness to address its own policies on the Palestinian issue.

Looking ahead: continuity over change

In 2027, China and Israel will mark the 35th anniversary of diplomatic relations and the tenth anniversary of their Innovative Comprehensive Partnership. The anniversaries offer an opportunity to give bilateral ties fresh momentum. At their meeting in October, Wang Yi and Herzog agreed to use the occasion to broaden cooperation. Even if Eisenkot takes office, Israel’s approach to China will remain shaped by coalition politics, its relationship with Washington and differences over regional security.

Diplomatic contact, people-to-people exchanges and trade and civilian cooperation in non-sensitive areas may gradually expand. The two countries may also find opportunities to work together to promote dialogue and ease regional tensions. The election is unlikely to bring a significant change in the overall direction of China-Israel relations, while practical cooperation between the two countries should continue to make progress.

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