With ‘Shenzhen 1.0’, China, US and Russia are at the table — but can consensus hold?
Xi, Trump and Putin have issued an unprecedented joint peace declaration in Shenzhen. While scholars hail a new “Shenzhen 1.0” consultation format with China as the biggest winner, turning principles into reality remains uncertain. Lianhe Zaobao associate China news editor Sim Tze Wei dives into the issue.
20 Nov 2026
Politics
(This is an edited version of an article first published on Lianhe Zaobao (English edition).)
A closely watched summit of Chinese, US and Russian leaders has taken place in Shenzhen. The three countries issued an unprecedented peace declaration after the meeting, setting out four points of consensus on international peace and security. Scholars interviewed said the summit, held against a backdrop of strategic competition among major powers, opened a new format for consultation that could be termed “Shenzhen 1.0 for major-power relations”. Whether the consensus can be put into practice, however, remains to be seen.
The leaders of three nuclear powers held a historic meeting lasting about 90 minutes at Shenzhen’s Kylin Villa on 19 November at the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting. It was the first trilateral meeting of the three countries’ top leaders and the first time they had expressed their positions in a joint declaration.
Chinese President Xi Jinping spoke first, stressing, “When major powers are at peace, the world is stable; when major powers clash, the world is in turmoil.” Russian President Vladimir Putin said the three countries should discuss global and regional affairs and energy security. US President Donald J. Trump, who spoke last, said the three countries were “making history” and disclosed that the talks covered issues including nuclear weapons and the Russia-Ukraine war.
The versions of the peace declaration issued by the three countries after the meeting were broadly identical, differing only in the order in which the countries were named in the title. China called it the “Peace Declaration of the Leaders of China, Russia and the US”; the US called it the “Peace Declaration of the Leaders of the US, Russia and China”; and Russia called it the “Peace Declaration of the Leaders of Russia, China and the US”.
Four areas of consensus
The declaration covers four areas: advancing United Nations (UN) reform to address global challenges; increasing the production and supply of refined petroleum products to maintain energy supplies stability; emphasising the principle of state consent and immunity for state officials, while opposing the abuse of jurisdiction by the International Criminal Court (ICC) and similar institutions; and reaffirming that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”, while pursuing dialogue on reducing nuclear risks and preventing nuclear proliferation.
Professor Zhu Feng, a distinguished professor at Nanjing University and former dean of the School of International Studies, told Lianhe Zaobao that despite continuing strategic competition, including the China-US technology war, the leaders’ willingness to sit down and discuss war and peace and global governance was itself an important step forward. He said the summit should not be interpreted as a “Yalta 2.0”, with major powers carving out spheres of influence. Rather, it should be seen as opening a new format for major-power consultation — “Shenzhen 1.0 for major-power relations”.
However, according to Reuters, Russian President Vladimir Putin said after the summit that it had not set grand objectives, that there were no arrangements to enforce its decisions, and that the three countries had not agreed to hold such meetings regularly. This suggests that while the three sides are trying a new approach to dialogue, they have yet to establish a standing mechanism.
Zhu also noted that the declaration mainly reflected consensus on principles at this stage, with implementation the key. If the three countries could help ease tensions over Iran and effectively contain the fighting in Ukraine, their leaders might eventually receive recognition through the Nobel Peace Prize. But it remained difficult to predict how far this model could go, as domestic political changes and leadership transitions in the US and Russia could affect foreign policy continuity.
Strategic calculations behind each pledge

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Lye Liang Fook, an associate senior fellow at Singapore’s ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, said China appeared to be the summit’s biggest winner. Bringing about the first meeting of the three leaders and a joint declaration underscored China’s standing as a major global strategic player and reinforced its international image as the US’s principal strategic competitor.
Lye said each of the declaration’s four points reflected strategic considerations. UN reform reflected China’s desire to uphold the UN’s central role and increase the Global South’s representation. It also showed that the three countries had no intention of setting up a new mechanism to replace the existing system. The energy provisions aligned with Russia’s interest in expanding exports, the US’s interest in safeguarding its energy industry and China’s interest in leveraging its refining capacity. They also built upon earlier US-Russia cooperation. “This is probably what Trump wanted most,” Lye said.
The third point, concerning immunity for state officials and the ICC, reflected the three countries’ concerns about the jurisdiction of international judicial bodies, as well as the personal concerns of leaders such as Putin. Legally, however, the declaration cannot remove the ICC’s jurisdiction. On nuclear risks, given the substantial gap between the size of China’s nuclear arsenal and those of the US and Russia, China had not agreed to join US-Russia strategic nuclear disarmament talks. The three countries had so far reached only an agreement in principle to hold dialogue and this did not amount to a Chinese commitment to reduce its nuclear arsenal.
Bilateral talks remain primary channel
Before the trilateral meeting, China and the US, and the US and Russia, held separate bilateral talks, while Xi and Putin met on 18 November. China and the US agreed to draw up an action plan to implement the new framing of their ties as a “constructive China-US relationship of strategic stability”. Trump and Putin held talks lasting about 40 minutes, focusing on Ukraine, but no ceasefire agreement was announced. While APEC provided opportunities for bilateral engagement among many countries, China and Japan, whose relations remain strained, did not arrange a formal meeting. Xi and Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae only interacted briefly at the venue.
Lye noted that trilateral coordination could not replace bilateral relations, and bilateral meetings remained the main avenue for addressing differences. Trump wanted to bring the US and Russia closer to reduce Putin’s dependence on China. Russia, the weakest of the three, hoped that direct dialogue between Putin and Trump would give it greater leverage in subsequent negotiations over Ukraine.
On whether trilateral consultations would change the international landscape and affect other countries’ interests, Lye said good relations among the three major powers would help international stability. However, they remained strategic competitors, with differences on many issues and mutual trust still needing to be strengthened. Trilateral coordination was therefore unlikely in the short term to replace existing international organisations such as the UN or fundamentally change how international affairs are conducted.
Related: Shenzhen APEC: From world’s factory to rule-shaper? | How China sustains the illusion of equality with Russia
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