The Taiwan Strait needs circuit breakers, not just deterrence

In mid-August, the redeployment of the USS George Washington from the Western Pacific towards the Middle East, alongside a Chinese-Indonesian naval interaction east of Taiwan, revived a familiar debate: are wars elsewhere diverting American assets and attention from the Western Pacific?

The carrier’s departure temporarily leaves the region without a US carrier presence. Beijing presented the interaction with Indonesia as a navigation exercise, while Jakarta described it as a routine passing exercise with no war-fighting purpose. There is no evidence that the two decisions were connected, but their concurrence captured the pressure of managing strategic competition across several theatres.

The debate is often framed around whether regional countries might accidentally fall into conflicts while the US is distracted elsewhere. Competition for military resources matters, but Ukraine and Iran point to a deeper problem: war termination.

Political leaders may decide when to use force, but resistance, external intervention and incompatible security demands soon narrow their control. Campaigns conceived as limited can become prolonged wars or recurring cycles of strikes, retaliation and temporary truces, absorbing resources and reshaping regional security long after their original assumptions have failed.

From temporary to long-term state of war

Western Pacific policymakers should therefore look beyond the immediate battlefield lessons on drones, missiles, air defence, distributed logistics and infrastructure resilience. The more consequential question is whether the region can contain and terminate a conflict once deterrence fails. Persistent grey-zone encounters, interconnected alliances, nuclear-conventional entanglement and concentrated supply chains could turn a limited incident into an open-ended regional confrontation. Stronger deterrence must be matched by mechanisms for escalation control and war termination.

Russia appears to have expected military shock to produce political submission at manageable cost. Ukrainian mobilisation and Western support instead produced attritional war. Territorial control matters, but the hardest question is Ukraine’s future security: guarantees sufficient for Kyiv look threatening to Moscow, while arrangements acceptable to Moscow leave Ukraine exposed. The anti-ballistic missile programme announced by Ukraine and nine European partners reflects an expectation that the threat will outlast negotiation. Wartime measures are entering Europe’s long-term security architecture.

Iran presents another form of protraction. US and Israeli strikes can damage targets but cannot cheaply impose a stable order. Iran can retaliate through missiles, drones, armed groups and pressure on the Strait of Hormuz, yet cannot defeat the US in a conventional war. Washington seeks to prevent a nuclear weapon state without occupation; Israel seeks to stop Iran from regenerating nuclear, missile and proxy capabilities; Gulf states want protection without indefinite war or collapse. Tehran treats these as insurance. With the June settlement in tatters and Washington prepared to maintain its blockade indefinitely, the pattern is cyclical: strike, retaliate, mediate, rearm and strike again.

China will exercise strategic caution

Beijing has reasons to study both cases. Any resort to the “non-peaceful means and other necessary measures” envisaged in Article 8 of China’s Anti-Secession Law would entail amphibious logistics, possible US and Japanese intervention, sanctions, disrupted shipping, resistance and postwar governance. China’s trade and energy exposure would magnify the shock. Ukraine shows how mobilisation and external support can frustrate rapid victory; Iran shows the limits of long-range strikes as instruments of political compellence. Whatever Beijing’s view of developments around Taiwan, these lessons favour caution about major war.

Such caution can coexist with efforts to reinforce jurisdictional claims below the threshold of armed conflict. China uses coast guard patrols, military exercises and administrative measures. Since June, Chinese coast guard ships have operated repeatedly east of Taiwan; Beijing describes the missions as law enforcement, while Taipei rejects any Chinese jurisdiction there. The subsequent exercise with Indonesia added an international dimension, although Jakarta qualified Beijing’s presentation. They can establish presence and shape expectations while limiting immediate escalation risks.

Stability-instability paradox

Beijing calculates that Washington is unlikely to risk war over one patrol; Japan will seek to contain an encounter; Manila will hesitate before turning a coast guard collision into an alliance crisis; and Taipei will calibrate its response below a blockade. The pattern gives every actor incentives to test limits without triggering wider conflict. Yet accommodation remains possible. Manila and Beijing have resumed maritime talks, and President Marcos sees a “distinct possibility” of joint oil and gas exploration. Competition, deterrence and transactional cooperation coexist — the conditions of a stability-instability paradox.

A breakdown could transmit shocks quickly. The Western Pacific concentrates Chinese manufacturing, Japanese and South Korean industry, Taiwan’s semiconductor ecosystem, Southeast Asian production networks and vital shipping routes. It also lies under the nuclear shadow of China, the US, Russia and North Korea. A crisis could connect Taiwan, the East and South China seas, the Korean peninsula and US bases in Japan and the Philippines. The George Washington redeployment adds another dimension: open-ended conflict in one theatre can draw finite forces and attention from deterrence elsewhere. American power in the Pacific remains substantial, but the redeployment raises the risk of misreading US priorities.

Conflict could begin ambiguously. A coast guard patrol might be followed by an inspection regime; resistance could lead to quarantine or blockade; military escorts could produce warning shots and limited strikes. Governments would disagree over when law enforcement ended and conflict began. Fatalities would engage alliance commitments and domestic politics, narrowing room for compromise. Taiwan presents the hardest termination problem because Beijing, Taipei and Washington lack a mutually acceptable end state. A ceasefire could halt operations without resolving the dispute driving them.

Regional safeguards needed

The region therefore needs operational circuit breakers alongside deterrence. Principles underlying the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea should be adapted for coast guards, government-directed civilian vessels, maritime militia and unmanned systems. Arrangements should address collisions, dangerous interceptions, fire-control radar illumination, cockpit lasers and boarding procedures. Major exercises and missile tests need advance notice, defined operating areas and clear end times. Command-level hotlines should remain staffed during political disputes, backed by deadlines for incident reporting and technical investigation.

The region’s functional multilateral institutions offer a practical approach. The ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus can develop norms on exercise notification, search and rescue, and protection of civilian infrastructure. US-China, China-Japan and China-Philippines channels must handle bilateral risks. Taiwan’s absence requires parallel technical, unofficial or third-party cross-strait channels. Nuclear-conventional entanglement belongs in a dedicated US-China strategic stability dialogue. Each arrangement should leave sovereignty and jurisdictional claims untouched, allowing governments to step back without appearing to concede them.

Ukraine’s missile programme shows how protracted war reshapes institutions. Iran shows how failed termination absorbs resources across theatres. The Western Pacific is investing heavily in arsenals, alliances and resilient infrastructure; its investment in crisis management and political off-ramps remains thinner. Its most dangerous war may begin when each government assumes the others want to avoid it and can absorb one more patrol, interception or exercise. Deterrence can suppress deliberate aggression. Workable circuit-breakers are needed to prevent mutual restraint from becoming a licence for cumulative risk.

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