Why China’s firepower fails to translate into sales

China’s continuous breakthroughs in top-tier weapon systems such as J-20 stealth fighters, aircraft carriers, advanced armed drones, and unmanned surface and underwater vehicles, have sparked debate that it might capture a larger share of the global arms market by expanding its exports. Amidst this, some favourable developments have strengthened this impression.

The India-Pakistan aerial conflict in May 2025, in which Pakistan used Chinese-supplied weapons and claimed to have shot down Indian jets, including the French Rafale, promptly brought Chinese weapons into the global limelight. In the past, Chinese weapons were widely seen as inferior to Western counterparts and rarely the first choice for buyers

Factors such as China being the world’s second-largest arms producer, with one of the largest and most comprehensive military-industrial bases, rapidly expanding joint military exercises internationally, a growing presence in international defence exhibitions, and the expansion of its own defence expos further bolster this perception.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)  fact sheet published in March 2026, suggests China is only a modest supplier. For the period from 2021 to 2025, Beijing’s arms exports constituted merely 5.6% of the total global trade, making it the fifth-largest supplier. Although Chinese weapons were supplied to 47 countries during this period, the bulk went to a few close partners.

Pakistan consistently remained the largest importer, receiving 61% of China’s arms during this period. Other major recipients were Serbia and Thailand, which received 6.8% and 4.7%, respectively. In the past, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and occasionally Algeria were among the leading recipients.

When compared to its own volume, China’s exports slightly increased; however, on the global stage, Beijing lost one spot, dropping from the fourth largest arms supplier during 2020-24 to fifth in the latest period, falling behind Germany. China’s share in the global arms trade never crossed 6% at any point. This share pales in comparison to that of the US, which has consistently remained the world’s largest exporter, capturing around 40-42% of the world’s arms market.

The nature of Chinese weapons exports also indicates its limited scale and scope. In only a few cases did China supply medium- to advanced-level weapons. These include J-10 fighters, Type 054A frigates and jointly built JF-17s (only to Pakistan), as well as HQ-9/FD-2000 long-range surface-to-air missile systems to Pakistan and a few other countries, two refurbished submarines to Bangladesh, as well as a commitment of eight to Pakistan, and three to Thailand. Pakistan additionally received a large array of weapons, but the relationship with this country is an exception.

Other major Chinese exports include multiple-launch rocket systems, armoured vehicles such as tanks and artillery, and CH-3/4/5 and Wing Loong UCAVs. Reports of China’s export of the J-10 to Indonesia and the J-35 to Pakistan are based on expectations; no government-level contracts have been signed.

Despite its broad portfolio of advanced systems, China exports only a limited subset to a few clients.

Significant barriers stand in the way of China expanding its arms to new recipients. First and foremost, China refrains from military alliances and formal security guarantees, and it has generally avoided supplying weapons during active conflicts, even to partners. Except for its Cold War alliance with North Korea, China has avoided formal alliances with other nations.

Beijing’s restraint is evident in its responses to recent US actions in Venezuela and Iran. China signed partnership agreements with both countries, but when these partners came under US attack, China confined its support to diplomacy alone. When the media reported that China was supplying CM-302 anti-ship missiles to Iran, Chinese officials hurriedly clarified their position by rejecting those reports.

China’s cautiousness and restraint discourage most buyers from developing military dependence on it. For many buyers, arms procurements are crucial tools to build defence and strategic relationships with major suppliers, and seek their political, and if possible, security backing in times of crisis. Many US partnerships and alliances globally are centred around these security-centric arrangements.

Furthermore, China’s relatively narrow and weak client base, made up mainly of developing countries with struggling economies, cannot afford sophisticated, higher-priced weapons, which keeps China’s overall market share minimal.

By contrast, arms importers from developed economies in East Asia, the oil-rich Gulf, and Europe remain closely tied to US and other Western suppliers, aligning their operational and doctrinal practices accordingly. Pulling them away from their traditional buyers is neither China’s intention nor easy.

Crucially, most of China’s weapons remain untested in real-world situations. The 2025 India-Pakistan aerial clash partially validated a few systems, but it did not fundamentally change broader perceptions of Chinese weapons. China itself has not engaged in large-scale combat operations since the 1979 war with Vietnam, leaving much of its newer hardware without extensive real-world testing. Successful tests and trials are crucial to the credibility of weapons.

Seemingly, China’s primary objective of rapid weapon modernisation is to strengthen its own defence, equip the PLA with modern weapons, reduce dependence on imported systems, and stockpile for a potential high-end conflict in the Taiwan Strait and the broader Western Pacific theatre, where Japan and the Philippines are asserting themselves with US backing.

Advances in weapon systems do not automatically make China a major global arms exporter. To become one, China needs structural changes to its policies on alliances, security, and arms exports, but this does not seem to be China’s priority at the moment. 

To conclude, China will continue to supply arms to similar buyers and may even attract new ones, especially for its medium-sized, tech-intensive systems. Given these structural constraints, the prospect of China becoming a major supplier of advanced offensive weapons and significantly increasing its market share remains elusive.

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