Blue vs Green, again: Did Ko Wen-je sink Taiwan’s third force?

As Taiwan People’s Party founder Ko Wen-je appeals a 17-year prison sentence, attacks on the judiciary and shifting voter sentiment are reshaping Taiwan’s political landscape ahead of the 2026 local elections, argues academic Chang Chun-yen.

16 Nov 2026

Politics

Taipei 101 on the skyline of Taipei, Taiwan, on 22 September 2026.
Taipei 101 on the skyline of Taipei, Taiwan, on 22 September 2026. (Ann Wang/Reuters)

(Edited and refined by James Loo, with the assistance of AI translation.)

On 26 March 2026, the Taipei District Court sentenced Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) founding chairman Ko Wen-je to a combined 17 years in prison and deprivation of civil rights for six years in a first-instance ruling on cases involving the Core Pacific City and political donations, among others. The cases remain under appeal, and the verdict is not final. These proceedings have not only dealt a blow to Ko’s political career but also damaged the image of the relatively young party he founded, while reigniting debate in Taiwan over the relationship between the judiciary, party competition and political accountability.

Ko and the TPP continue to advance a narrative of political persecution. Yet a closer look at opinion polls, trends in party identification and positioning for the year-end elections prompts more reasoned reflection and questioning among Taiwan’s citizens: how much support can this appeal actually mobilise, and is it causing voters who once hoped for a new kind of politics to lose faith?

Political persecution?

Since Ko’s cases entered the judicial process in 2024, two competing interpretations have emerged. Some members of the public see political suppression behind his detention and the investigations; others believe that politicians facing serious corruption allegations should be subject to judicial scrutiny and should not enjoy immunity because of their political status.

Well before the first-instance ruling, a September 2025 poll by the Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation found that 41.7% of respondents agreed that Ko’s detention amounted to political persecution by the Lai Ching-te administration, while 44.6% disagreed. Agreement with this view had risen from 28.6% in September 2024. This suggests that the TPP’s sustained messaging about “political persecution” had gained some traction with the public.

Notably, the survey also revealed sharp differences along party lines: about 87% of TPP supporters and 71% of Kuomintang (KMT) supporters accepted the political persecution narrative, while about 87% of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) supporters took the opposite view. This shows how strongly existing political allegiances shape public interpretations of the same judicial case. 

Ko Wen-je engaging his supporters at Shanhua night market in Tainan on 9 January 2024.
Ko Wen-je engaging his supporters at Shanhua night market in Tainan on 9 January 2024. (SPH Media)

However, the survey was conducted before the first-instance ruling in 2026, when the public had yet to see the court’s full reasoning and assessment of the evidence. Although the political persecution narrative once commanded considerable public support, the political development to watch is whether people continue to accept it as the cases proceed through trial and judgment, or begin to reassess Ko and the TPP in light of the evidence gradually made public.

From reformist promise to eroding support

When the TPP was founded in 2019, its pledges to transcend the Blue-Green divide, embrace openness and transparency and take a rational, pragmatic approach attracted voters dissatisfied with traditional politics. But when a political leader faces questions about integrity and accountability, those same promises become benchmarks against which voters reassess the party.

Long-running surveys by National Chengchi University’s Election Study Center show that identification with the TPP fell from 14.3% in 2023 to 8.8% in June 2026, when the figures for the DPP and KMT stood at 33.8% and 21.0% respectively. This trend suggests that the TPP’s support base is shrinking. However, two data points alone cannot establish that the loss of support was caused by Ko’s cases.

The cases have also highlighted a shift in the party’s public messaging, away from public policy and institutional reform towards the legal troubles of its founding leader. Such political communication may consolidate its most loyal supporters, but it could also alienate a broad swathe of swing voters. In particular, a political persecution narrative unsupported by concrete evidence could damage the party’s image, given that transparency and rationality were central to its founding identity.

Winds of change ahead of 2026 elections

In the 2022 local elections, the KMT won 14 county magistrate and mayoral posts, the DPP won five, and the TPP secured the Hsinchu mayoralty. But the political mood has changed ahead of the 2026 elections. A nationwide public sentiment survey conducted by Taiwanese polling expert Tai Li-an from 20 to 22 October 2026 found that 43.4% of respondents would feel more reassured with the DPP governing their county or city over the next four years, compared with 27.1% who chose the KMT. 

Meanwhile, 38.1% expected the DPP to win at least 11 counties and cities, against 28.7% who favoured the KMT’s chances of doing so. Based on a nationwide sample, the survey reflects the broader political mood in Taiwanese society.

Some analysts currently see New Taipei City, Changhua County, Yilan County and Chiayi City as potential DPP wins. New Taipei is attracting particular attention because it could be a key battleground shaping the contest for the 2028 presidency. The DPP’s Su Chiao-hui injected energy into the New Taipei race early on and now has strong momentum — a situation the KMT probably did not initially anticipate. Meanwhile, Tainan and Kaohsiung, both long governed by the DPP, are still considered relatively secure for the party.

Taipei Mayor Chiang Wan-an, who is seeking re-election, greets supporters at a morning market during a campaign event in Taipei, Taiwan, on 15 November 2026.
Taipei Mayor Chiang Wan-an, who is seeking re-election, greets supporters at a morning market during a campaign event in Taipei, Taiwan, on 15 November 2026. (Ann Wang/Reuters)

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Can the KMT therefore repeat its sweeping victory of 2022 and regain the upper hand in local elections? That is very much an open question.

True third force, or flash in the pan?

As a third party, the TPP faces challenges beyond its leader’s legal troubles. It must also demonstrate that its grassroots organisation can sustain its long-term development. The People First Party, another former third force, once rose on the charisma of its leader. But constraints on expanding its organisation and talent pool gradually eroded its ability to compete nationwide, and it faded from prominence.

The TPP and KMT have already coordinated in some constituencies, potentially avoiding a split in their support. Yet the deeper their cooperation, the more readily questions arise about the TPP’s professed independence as a third force. In a recent interview, Japanese scholar and Taiwan specialist Yoshiyuki Ogasawara noted that the TPP’s local organisation remained relatively weak. Whether it could increase its number of local council seats would be an important indicator of its future development.

The elections on 28 November should therefore be assessed not merely through the single contest for Hsinchu mayor, but also through council races across counties and cities, the party’s local talent pool as well as its ability to sustain grassroots work. If voters recognise only its leader’s appeals over his legal troubles but see no credible public policies, the TPP could be headed for a diminished role.

Putting judicial credibility to the test

The TPP has repeatedly levelled strong criticism at Taiwan’s judicial system over Ko’s cases. Taiwan’s judiciary is certainly not without problems, but its institutional achievements over the years cannot be dismissed solely because politicians make accusations. A 2026 report by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), assessing data for 2025, ranked Taiwan 19th globally for rule of law.

Transparency International’s 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index ranked Taiwan 24th among 182 countries and territories assessed. This index measures relative perceptions of public-sector corruption and is not a substitute for an indicator of judicial independence, but it helps illuminate the institutional environment in which Taiwan is governed. Public trust in the judiciary is also surveyed regularly and openly within Taiwan. A 2025 Judicial Yuan survey of 5,006 people found that 59.8% trusted judges, while about 65% agreed that judges ruled according to law and imposed appropriate sentences.

Puma Shen, the ruling Democratic Progressive Party's candidate for Taipei mayor, poses for a photo with supporters during a campaign visit to Huannan Market in Taipei, Taiwan on 5 November 2026.
Puma Shen, the ruling Democratic Progressive Party's candidate for Taipei mayor, poses for a photo with supporters during a campaign visit to Huannan Market in Taipei, Taiwan on 5 November 2026. (Ann Wang/Reuters)

On the one hand, these figures do not establish that Taiwan’s judicial system is highly trustworthy. Nevertheless, its institutional foundations — court trials, avenues of appeal, published judgments, media scrutiny and continuing judicial reform — give it a measure of credibility. On the other hand, Ko and the TPP have a legitimate right in a democratic society to criticise investigative procedures, the necessity of detention or individual rulings. But if they go further and use individual cases to allege that the entire judiciary takes orders from the executive, the burden of proof should rightfully be on them to produce credible and verifiable evidence to substantiate their claims.

Facts, not institutional attacks

As a scholar of communication and sociology, I opine that the most troubling political phenomenon in Ko’s cases is the way in which a politician can turn his personal legal crisis into an attack on the legitimacy of the judicial system as a whole. When political leaders repeatedly reduce complex disputes over evidence and law to a story of people being persecuted by those in power, using it to rally supporters and generate public pressure, this appears to be the kind of populist mobilisation politicians commonly deployed in political communication.

If the judiciary must be free from political pressure, parties cannot make the erosion of institutional trust a means of defending their leaders or rescuing their electoral prospects. For the TPP in particular, founded on the ideals of openness and transparency, a full response to the evidence and legal issues by its leader and his defence team would do far more to meet voters’ expectations of accountable politics than an ever-expanding narrative of judicial persecution. This does not negate the defendant’s presumption of innocence, right to a defence or right of appeal. Ko’s ultimate legal responsibility must still be determined by judicial rulings.

Another concern is that a communication strategy built on loud claims of judicial injustice and political persecution may underestimate the judgment of Taiwan’s citizens. Years of democratisation, changes in governing party and public debate mean that many voters will not abandon scrutiny of the facts, legal procedures and political integrity simply because a political leader claims to be a victim. As more information becomes public, voters who once placed their hopes in the TPP may gradually drift away in disappointment.

The local elections on 28 November will be an important test of these developments. Whether the TPP can remain a third force or gradually shrink into a subordinate role within an existing political alliance remains unknown. For Taiwan’s democracy, however, what truly matters is a basic lesson: every politician must submit to scrutiny by both democratic institutions and citizens, and respond with facts, evidence and accountability.

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