From G2 to G3 to G1: Is Beijing playing for the top spot?

China’s stress on the sovereign equality of all countries has not stopped it from participating in, and even orchestrating, big power configurations such as the G2 or G3. There are indications that Beijing is even laying the groundwork for G1 status, says ISEAS researcher Lye Liang Fook.

20 Nov 2026

Politics

A giant screen from the media centre shows Chinese President Xi Jinping attending the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Economic Leaders' Meeting in Shenzhen, Guangdong province, China, on 19 November 2026.
A giant screen from the media centre shows Chinese President Xi Jinping attending the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Economic Leaders' Meeting in Shenzhen, Guangdong province, China, on 19 November 2026. (Florence Lo/Reuters)

Officially, China does not subscribe to big power configurations like the Group of Two (G2), i.e., the US and China, or the G3, which includes Russia. However, recent developments suggest that Beijing is not averse to, and is even orchestrating, gatherings of major powers to discuss issues of common concern — regardless of the outcomes — to project its global power status. There are even signs that China is seeking a more prominent G1 position in the global order, potentially challenging the US as the foremost superpower.

From a new model of major-country relationship to G2

Xi Jinping first proposed a new model of China-US major country relationship during his 2012 visit to the US (as vice-president), where he called on the two countries to work together despite their differences. The key tenets of this model encompass no conflict, no confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation. Xi has further said that the vast Pacific coasts have enough space to accommodate both China and the US.

China’s call for a new type of major-power relationship was a response to America’s pivot to Asia policy unveiled in 2011, in which the US sought to commit more resources, including military assets, to the Asia-Pacific, which Beijing saw as containment. As a growing but still weaker power then, China was concerned that its rise would become more challenging if America devoted more attention to the region. Hence, the stress on cooperation over competition.

Additionally, China wanted America to recognise it, either explicitly or implicitly, as an equal partner. However, it was not successful at that time. When Xi embarked on his first state visit to America in 2015, Beijing regarded the new model of major country relationship as a concrete deliverable of the visit. However, the US completely ignored such a reference and was only interested in functional areas of cooperation between the two countries.

US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping walk together as they tour the Temple of Heaven in Beijing, China, on 14 May 2026.
US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping walk together as they tour the Temple of Heaven in Beijing, China, on 14 May 2026. (Evan Vucci/Reuters)

Xi had also earlier debunked the Thucydides trap argument that a rising power (ie China) will most likely clash with an established power (i.e., the US) and expressed confidence that the two countries can steer a course away from confrontation. More recently, Xi has insisted — during Trump’s China visit in May 2026 and when he himself visited the US in September 2026 — that the Thucydides trap can be overcome if the two countries work together. A key difference between then and now is that America’s perception of China has changed.

In the second half of 2025, the US publicly recognised China’s importance and its peer competitor status. A large part of this development probably has to do with Beijing standing up to the US on trade matters and its tightening of rare earth and critical minerals exports as leverage against America. It was Trump who said that the G2, comprising the US and China, would convene shortly just before he met Xi in Busan in October 2025 that led to a trade truce. Using language that reflected G2 status, Xi reportedly told Trump on the same occasion that the two countries could jointly shoulder responsibilities as major countries and work together to accomplish concrete outcomes for the good of both and the world.

More tellingly, Trump agreed to Xi’s proposal to define US-China ties as one of constructive strategic stability, reinforcing China’s preference for the leaders of the two countries to design a framework to guide the overall development of ties. The Whitehouse read-out of Trump’s visit to China in May 2026 said that both sides agreed to build a constructive relationship of strategic stability on the basis of fairness and reciprocity.

When Xi visited America in September 2026, the US and China used almost identical phrasing to reiterate their commitment to a constructive relationship of strategic stability on the basis of respect, fairness, and reciprocity. China regards respect as encompassing respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, respect for each country’s chosen social system and development path, and respect for each other’s core interests and major concerns. All of the above interpretations entail the US recognising China as a big power in its own right, and arguably one that was equivalent in status to America.

G3 a feather in the cap for Beijing

An unofficial Chinese view put forward more than a year ago suggested that, following Trump’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska in August 2025 — which saw Russia emerge from diplomatic isolation — and with Trump, Xi and Putin expected to meet more often in the coming months, a US-China-Russia tripolar configuration, with the three powers leading the globe as the G3, might be on the horizon.

Russian President Vladimir Putin speaks at a press conference, on the second day of the the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Economic Leaders' Meeting in Shenzhen, Guangdong province, China, on 19 November 2026.
Russian President Vladimir Putin speaks at a press conference, on the second day of the the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Economic Leaders' Meeting in Shenzhen, Guangdong province, China, on 19 November 2026. (Maxim Shemetov/Reuters)

A Trump-Xi-Putin summit eventually took place in Shenzhen in November 2026 that touched on a range of issues including the international order, energy and food security, AI governance cooperation, nuclear non-proliferation, and the situation in the Middle East, Ukraine and on the Korean peninsula. As expected, the outcomes were limited and were more aspirational than substantive, such as their desire to press ahead with UN reforms, plans to increase the production and sale of refined petroleum, and agreement to promote discussions on minimising nuclear risks and proliferation. They further opposed the International Court of Justice and other similar institutions from abusing their jurisdictions without state consent and respect for the immunity enjoyed by state officials.

Beyond the outcomes, China’s ability to deliver the first-ever summit involving the three most powerful countries in the world is already of groundbreaking significance. To be sure, the lead-up to this summit was not entirely smooth. Beijing initially seemed lukewarm to the idea of a summit, apparently due to differences over the agenda and format. In fact, the impetus for the summit came primarily from Russia and the US.

Putin reportedly raised the possibility of a trilateral summit in Shenzhen in a phone call with Trump in September 2026 to negotiate an end to the Ukraine war (without Ukraine’s participation) — an approach akin to what happened at the 1945 Yalta Conference when the leaders of the US, Russia and the UK carved up Europe without European representation. China, then under the Kuomintang government, was also at the receiving end when Russia was granted territorial concessions in Asia, including in Manchukuo.

When queried about Putin’s proposal, China’s foreign ministry spokeswoman said in October 2026 that she had no information to share on this matter. This bland reply is not unusual, as China normally does not release details of leaders’ visits until a few days before. More significantly, Xi was reportedly taken aback by the idea of a trilateral summit to discuss Ukraine when German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier raised this topic when he called on Xi in Beijing in October 2026. Xi apparently told Steinmeier that this was a European conflict in which Europeans would also have to be at the negotiating table.

China was similarly opposed to Trump’s proposal for a trilateral summit to discuss arms control on the basis that its nuclear stockpile is nowhere near that of the US or Russia. Furthermore, while Beijing’s preference was for the summit to be a tightly scripted affair, with the leaders relying largely on prepared texts, the Trump administration reportedly favoured a looser format that would allow for more exchange.

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Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Donald Trump arrive for a trilateral meeting at Kylin Villa on 19 November 2026 in Shenzhen, China.
Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Donald Trump arrive for a trilateral meeting at Kylin Villa on 19 November 2026 in Shenzhen, China. (Win McNamee/via Reuters)

The first public indication from Beijing that arrangements for a trilateral summit were moving along came in the late afternoon of 4 November 2026 — by then the results of the US mid-term elections would largely be known — when its foreign ministry confirmed that China was in communication with the relevant parties regarding a meeting between the three heads of state.

From China’s perspective, Trump would appreciate the pomp and pageantry of a trilateral summit, something that he can rave about as a major foreign policy achievement — in fact, he described his China trip as great and highly consequential. This is all the more important in light of the Republican Party’s drubbing in the mid-term elections. In return, Beijing would like to see Trump keep US-China relations on an even keel at the very least and even to extend the trade truce beyond January 2027, if possible.

With regards to Moscow, a trilateral summit will be a plus for Putin as it burnishes Russia’s standing as a big power standing alongside the US and China, despite it being the weakest among the three. Putin himself would welcome a summit as it strengthens his hand in dealing with Ukraine and its European partners.

For Beijing, hosting a trilateral summit enhances China’s and especially Xi’s standing on the world stage. It demonstrates that China, along with the US and Russia, is in an enviable position to discuss matters affecting world peace and stability without getting into the details best resolved by the parties directly involved — a framing that would encompass the Ukraine War as well as the situation in the Middle East. Beijing also wants to show that the three countries are finding ways to get along despite their differences, which will not only benefit themselves but also the rest of the world. Both of the above messaging reinforce China’s peer competitor status vis-à-vis Russia and especially the US.

Gunning for G1

With G2 and now G3 becoming a reality, is China aiming for G1? Beijing has avoided discussing this aspiration publicly. It continues to highlight the domestic priority of getting its own affairs in order, including achieving high-quality development to drive the next phase of growth. Externally, Beijing has advocated a Community of Shared Future where countries reap the benefits of working together for peace and development. Its official parlance is that all states — regardless of their size, strength or wealth — are equal under international law. However, as discussed above, Beijing’s refrain of sovereign equality has not deterred it from pursuing great power configurations. In realpolitik, some countries are more equal than others.

People take photos as a motorcade carrying US President Donald Trump passes by after leaving the Langham Hotel before the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Economic Leaders' Meeting in Shenzhen, Guangdong province, China, on 19 November 2026.
People take photos as a motorcade carrying US President Donald Trump passes by after leaving the Langham Hotel before the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Economic Leaders' Meeting in Shenzhen, Guangdong province, China, on 19 November 2026. (Go Nakamura/Reuters)

There are indications that Beijing is laying the foundation for G1. Against the backdrop of the US belittling international institutions and disrupting the liberal trading order, Beijing has taken the lead to promote what it calls true multilateralism — including efforts to defend the international order and support global development, while reforming the global governance system to give greater voice and representation to developing countries, with China at the forefront.

All of the above thrusts will enable China to extend its global reach and influence at the expense of the West, especially the US. Moreover, getting its own house in order will put China on a stronger footing to compete with and eventually overtake the US.

Quasi-official Chinese narratives are already asserting that China or the Chinese system is superior to the West, and will eventually emerge victorious. In particular, China’s governance model — with key traits such as effective leadership under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), forging social consensus between the CCP and the masses, planning for the long term, and safeguarding the people’s well-being — has been touted as being superior to the US governance model — characterised by divisive politics, social discontent and disruption, and short-term political cycles and opportunism. The same Chinese narrative posits that the effectiveness of a country’s governance model is a more critical factor in determining a country’s strength than traditional indicators of economic strength or military might, and has become a key variable in determining the rise or fall of a nation.

Beijing has further enlisted foreign observers/experts, favourably disposed towards China, to provide an overly sanguine view of its future. British academic Martin Jacques has reportedly said that China is currently neck-to-neck with the US across many technological fields, and that in the area of artificial intelligence (AI) — a hallmark of modernity — China is in the process of surpassing the US. Martin further opined that the scale and speed of China’s modernisation already serves as an example for other nations to emulate, and that in the future it will be seen by the world as the very symbol of modernity. Implicit in the above argument is that China will eventually become No. 1.

China’s partake of G2 and G3, and possibly G1, is a more country-specific permutation of its view that the East is rising and the West is declining. With the belief in its inexorable rise, Beijing’s Middle Kingdom mentality — that other countries revolve around China and ought to accommodate more of its interests  — is likely to become more pronounced. To manage this development, the rest of the world will need to buckle down on further diversifying their political and economic linkages to keep their options open while pursuing win-win cooperation with China.

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